INTRODUCTION

Motivation of the Study
A firm can be defined as a " nexus of contract" 1 between different interest parties.
Contracts are formulated to bind the parties to predetermined goals and restrict them from opportunistic behavior. Contractual mechanisms are constructed using accounting numbers to root the goals and restrictions into a measurable form.
This leads to measurement and valuation decisions by firm managers, who are responsible for the accuracy and correctness of financial reporting. In this study the content of a firm' s contractual obligations are analyzed as the interplay between firms and a bank to investigate whether the benefits of conservative reporting are emphasized in a banking relationship. Conservative reporting is defined in this study as a differential timeliness in financial statement recognition of economic losses.
Financial reporting quality is interpreted as the usefulness of financial statement to investors, creditors, managers and other stakeholders contracting with the firm. Sterling (1970) rated conservatism as the most influential principle of valuation. There is wide academic discussion in the field of conservatism, and the valuation principles in accounting are a topical issue within the financial reporting standards. Financial reporting quality 2 is generally analyzed as earnings and its attributes 3
. Zhang (2004) investigated the efficiency gains from reporting conservatism in the loan contracting process and found benefits of conservative reporting to both lenders and borrowers. In their study the reporting conservatism benefits lenders through a timely signal of default risk in the form of accelerated covenant violations and borrowers benefit through lower initial interest rates. Further, Zhang (2004) found that out of seven earnings attributes only conservatism, persistency and smoothness incrementally reduced the cost of loan 4 . Ahmed et al. (2002) find that firms that choose reporting conservatism have a lower cost loan suggesting that conservatism plays an important role in efficient 1 See further Coase (1937) . 2 See further a commentary of empirical measures to assess earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent 2003) . 3 Earnings attributes: quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, timeliness, relevance and conservatism (Francis et al. 2004) . 4 The loan examined is restricted to bank loans, rather than public loan or private placements.
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contracting. Wittenberg-Moerman (2006) find that high quality of financial reporting reduces the information costs associated with loan agreements.
The examination of the demand for asymmetrically timely earnings is important. It would be expected that contracting parties have a greater demand for timely loss recognition than timely gain recognition (Quay 2006) . For example, holders of loan in a financially healthy firm are more likely to find significant bad news relevant to valuing their claims, and less likely to find good news important in valuing their claims. So, contracting-based demand for timely gains and losses is not symmetric.
The reason for proceeding studies in this field is lack of understanding of private firm' s financial reporting quality. Especially, this study examines the effect of financial reporting quality for bank' s loan pricing purposes. Asymmetric information is more prevalent in private firms than listed firms (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) . Academic literature lacks of evidence on financial reporting quality in private firms. Prior studies have found that the problem of asymmetric information is mitigated by reporting conservatism in listed firms (La Fond and Watts 2008) . La Fond and Watts (2008) find that changes in information asymmetry between equity investors lead to changes in conservatism. The pricing components of bank' s private firm loan has not been studied from reporting quality perspective, and this study contributes prior literature with private firm sample and an examination of loanholders perspective on financial reporting quality.
Definition of Reporting Conservatism
The " official" definition is that offered in the glossary of Statement of Concepts
No. 2 of the FASB, namely, that conservatism is a " prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered" . The Finnish Accounting Act refers prudence in its overall disclosure policies stating that financial statement should be presented prudent independent of earnings (FAA, 3:3:3). Maltby (2000) analyses the meaning of prudence as a historical survey. The characteristics of accounting information has long been identified with the idea that understatement is a virtue. It explains the bias in terms of the historical need of lenders to have a margin of safety on which to base lending decisions.
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Conservatism has influenced the accounting practice significantly and it has been considered as the most influential principle on valuation in accounting (Sterling 1970) . The benefits of reporting conservatism have been studied (Zhang 2004; Ahmed et al. 2002 5 ), but still there are different opinions about the benefits of conservatism among regulators, standard setters and academics.
The meaning of conservatism has changed and developed during the last century. Originally conservatism was considered as a reflection of honesty and competence in business. In the course of time, the concept of conservatism has been coupled with prudence principle and indeed the difference is not that significant; the slight difference between the terms conservatism and prudence is that prudence can be used to avoid the meaning of secret reserves and other practices that are associated with conservatism. (Evans and Nobes 1996) .
Reporting conservatism is defined in as a " differential verifiability required for recognition of profit versus losses" . The outcome is that earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news. The asymmetrical verification requirement for gains and losses makes is it possible to define the degree of conservatism (Basu 1997) . The greater the difference in the degree of verification for gains and losses, the greater is the conservatism. I refer to these two kinds of conservatism henceforth as ex-ante conservatism and ex-post conservatism, and the research method in this study is based on expost conservatism.
5 See further detailed information of loan ratings and conservatism.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, I examine whether reporting conservatism exists in private firms using asymmetric timeliness measure that is widely accepted method in prior financial accounting research. Second, I
examine the pricing of reporting conservatism in private firm loan contracts. The first purpose of my paper is a necessity of examining reporting conservatism in private firm context, because the main evidence of reporting conservatism in prior literature uses public firm samples. The second purpose of my study relates
closer to my dissertation project entitled " Reporting conservatism and intensity in bank-firm relationships: the effects on loan pricing" .
Contribution to the Literature
The contribution of the study is to shed light on the financial reporting quality of private companies as such. There is evidence that suggest lower reporting quality among private firms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005) . However, private firms represent a major role in many societies and their financial reporting quality should be also take into consideration. As there has been a lot of debate on firm' s corporate responsibility, this research path on financial reporting quality is incrementally augmenting the prevalent discussion. There is also on-going debate whether conservatism should be intended or not (LaFond and Watts 2008) .
Further, the contribution of this study is to provide evidence on the pricing of reporting conservatism in private loan contracts. According to my dissertation interviews with bank' s personnel (several anonymous interviews), the financial reporting quality is important element of firm evaluation, but the related definitions, methods and processes are not well-established. This study provides evidence that reporting conservatism affects the loan pricing significantly, and therefore it should be considered precisely and systematically in order to understand the pricing of corporate loans. In extreme cases, this line of research would even pre-empt credit losses on non-conservative borrowers. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) formulated three hypotheses of accounting' s role in contracts: bonus plan hypothesis, loan covenant hypothesis and political cost hypothesis. The opportunistic form of the loan covenant hypothesis asserts that the closer a firm is to violation of accounting-based loan covenants, the more likely the manager is to select accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the current period (Scott 2003, 277 
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THEORY AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
Theoretical Aspects of Conservatism in Loan Contracts
Information Asymmetry in Loan Contracts
Management has incentives to use their private information to manipulate earnings and other financial information and transfer wealth to themselves. As a result, this effect provides incentives for all contracting parties to the firm to find ways to reduce management' s private information relative to public information. 6 Lambert et al. (2006) show that information quality directly influences firm' s cost of capital and that improvements in information quality unambiguously reduce non-diversifiable risks.
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The level of information asymmetry between firm manager and bank' s lending officer is mainly due to different proportion of private and public information. Let 
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Accounting' s Role in Mitigating Asymmetric Information in Loan Contracts
Basu ( First, she finds that the bid-ask spread in secondary loan trading is positively related to firm-and loan characteristics associated with a high information asymmetry environment. Second, timely incorporation of economics losses into borrower' s financial statements reduces the bid-ask spread at which their loans are traded. Brown and Hillegeist (forthcoming) further studied the effect of disclosure quality on the level of information asymmetry. They find that the negative relation between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is primarily caused by reducing the likelihood that investors discover and trade in private information.
8 See further Peek et al. (2006) .
10(29)
Empirical Literature on Conservatism in Loan Contracts
Watts (2003 B) reviews the empirical literature of reporting conservatism. Previous literature uses several measurement approaches to conservatism: net asset measures, earnings and accrual measures, and earnings/stock return relation measures. Feltham-Ohlson (1995) valuation model is, among other purposes, used to estimate the extent of the undervaluation of net assets. Earnings and accrual measures have been studied in Basu (1997) and Givoly & Hayn (2000) . Basu (1997) studied the conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings and found that negative earnings changes are less persistent than positive earnings changes. Givoly and Hayn (2000) studied the changing timeseries properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals and found that the patterns of earnings, cash flows and accruals were consistent with an increase in conservative financial reporting over time.
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In the next subsection I examine the prior empirical findings on loan pricing and reporting conservatism and in the second subsection I further review the findings on measurement issues in reporting conservatism.
Loan Pricing and Reporting Conservatism
Quay and Verrecchia (2006) acknowledges that a large literature supports the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses, and that the efficiency of contracts is improved by implementing conservative reporting conventions. One of the more straightforward contracting setting that could create a demand for conservative reporting is loan contracts. Loanholders have a relatively greater demand for bad news, and if firms fail to provide such information, loanholders will price protect and impose a higher cost of capital on the firm.
Zhang (2004) analyze the ex post and ex ante benefits of conservatism to lenders and borrowers. First argument is that conservatism benefits lenders ex post through a timely signal of default risk in the form of accelerated covenant violations by more conservative borrowers. Second argument is that conservatism benefits borrowers ex ante through lower initial interest rates to those bor-9 Lara and Mora (2004) extended prior research on the international analysis of accounting conservatism comparing balance sheet and earnings conservatism in Europe.
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rowers who commit to or have a reputation for more conservative reporting. Conservative reports enable lenders to receive a timelier signal of deteriorating financial performance through a tightening of covenants or a triggering of covenant violations. The timely signal of deteriorating financial performance allows lenders to take protective action, thereby reducing their risk. Ahmed et al. (2002) provided empirical test of efficient contractings within reporting conservatism and cost of loan. They document that firms that face more severe conflicts over dividend policy tend to use more conservative reporting.
They find that firms that choose more conservative reporting have a lower cost of loan. Specifically, they used Standard & Poor' s senior loan rating as a proxy for the cost of loan, and found negative relation between conservatism and loan after controlling for profitability, leverage, firm size, equity risk and different industries.
Bharath et. al (2006) studied reporting quality and loan contracting. They find that bank loan borrowers with lower reporting quality face substantially higher interest spread. Sengupta (1998) provided similar evidence that firms with high disclosure quality ratings from financial analysts enjoy a lower effective interest cost of issuing loan. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) studied recently earnings quality in U.K. private firms and found that within private-companies the quality of financial reporting is lower due to different market demand. They hypothesize that earnings quality is determined primarily by the economic uses of financial statements. When audit requirements, accounting standards and tax laws are the same for public and private companies, the financial reporting of private companies is nevertheless lower in quality, because of the demands of market. They find that timely recognition of economic losses is reflected in different earnings skewness between public and private companies, despite of similar skewness in revenues.
The interpretation is that the difference in average earnings quality between public and private companies is an equilibrium outcome in the market for corporate financial reporting reflecting differences in demand for financial
reporting. The findings were tested comparing the private and public companies reporting using Basu' s (1997) time-series measure of timely cost recognition and their own accrual-based method.
Overall, there is a demand for conservative reporting in loan contracts. Listed and non-listed companies have differential demand for financial reporting. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find a lower financial reporting quality in private firms.
Several prior studies (Zhang 2004; Ahmed et al. 2002; Bharath et al. 2006 ) have
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studied the path of financial reporting quality in listed firms, where the demand for reporting conservatism is high. They find that higher financial reporting quality decreases the cost of loan in listed firms. Demand for conservative reporting in private firms is more focused to major stakeholders. Financial system in Finland is referred as bank-based system and bank is one of the firm' s major stakeholders.
Measurement Issues in Reporting Conservatism
Research on reporting conservatism represents a vast area of current financial accounting research. The phenomenon " conservatism" is a understandable concept, but its detection and measurement brings up many challenges. The measurement of conservatism as an asymmetric timeliness of earnings has developed during the last decade exceedingly (Ryan 2006 state that contracting theory predicts conditional conservatism. Contracting theory also predicts that the degree of asymmetry increases in the importance of country' s loan markets, but not the importance of equity markets. In contrast, value relevance theory suggest a symmetric and strong relation between earnings and returns, regardless the signs of returns. Gassen et al. (2006) show that conditional conservatism, unconditional conservatism and income smoothing are theoretically separable concepts yielding different earnings distributions. First, they investigate whether unconditional conservatism and income smoothing affect conditional conservatism and its international differences. They find that these attributes are preditably correlated with conditional conservatism. They also verified that income smoothing explains international differences in conditional conservatism.
Conditional conservatism appears to be driven more by firm-specific factors than by institutional factors.
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Ball and Shivakumar (2006) 
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Research Hypotheses
Healy and Palepu (2001) December and firm-specific loan information is captured in the end of December.
Connecting these two sources of information allows for the identification of their characteristics, such as the loan amount, loan service coverage and other key ratios (see further table 2). All firms are required to have bank' s internal rating and either short-or long-term loan margin. Consistent with prior literature, the sample includes only non-financial firms. After merging the loan-specific data with financial statement data, the final sample is reduced to 2.297 firm-year observations. The reason for missing observations is due to non-existence of bank' s internal rating and loan from subject bank.
Therefore there is no need for further exploration of systematic bias due to missing observations in this sample.
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Variable Measurement
This section provides details on the variable measurement. The first subsection presents variables for the loan data. The second subsection presents the variables and empirical models for the reporting conservatism. The last subsection discusses the control variables used in tests and finally summarizes the descriptive statistics in Table 2 .
Loan Data
The loan data in this study contains information on borrower, terms of the loan and firm characteristics in a single specified form. The loan data consists of longterm and short-term bank loans. In the firm-year period the median size of longterm loan is 872 thousand euros. The median firm size is 433 thousand euros based on total assets.
I use loan interest margin as a proxy for the loan pricing. Originally, the loan margin is determined separately for short-term and long-term loans. I calculated the loan margin as average margin weighted with proportion of long-term and short-term loan. The margin is presented as percentage unit over the underlying basis interest. The distribution of loan margin is normally distributed and key assumptions for regression analysis is fulfilled. Performance pricing 10 and revolving credits are excluded from the loan data.
Bank' s internal rating variable is used to account for the information content of bank' s firm-specific credit risk. These ratings collect information about financial position and credit risk and they are automatically determined by firm-specific information. A lower credit quality as reflected in ratings is likely to be associated with higher loan margin. I transform the eleven letter group ratings into numbers such that loan ratings are set from 1 (highest rating) to 6 (lowest rating).
The loan margin premium is defined as substraction of the firm-specific loan margin and the loan margin of equivalent internal rating group mean. The negative loan margin premium means that the firm is paying lower loan margin than the firms in the same internal rating group on average. Respectively, the 10 Performance pricing means that the interest rate is dependent of firm' s performance.
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positive loan margin premium firms are paying higher loan margins than their equivalent internal rating group mean. The negative premium firms incorporates 1.142 firm-year observations, and the positive premium firms 1.155 firm-year observations.
Reporting Conservatism Variables
Measuring the reporting conservatism can be accomplished with models utilized in earlier studies (Jones 1991; Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2005) . Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) scrutinized further the five discretionary accrual models 11 earlier evaluated by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) . Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) found that only the Jones and modified Jones models appeared to have the potential to provide reliable estimates of discretionary accruals. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) hypothesized that private company financial reporting is lower in quality because that is what market demands. They modeled the reporting conservatism using the Basu (1997) regression and also accrualsbased test of loss recognition. This accrual-based model employed was an adaptation of Dechow (1994) and Quay, Kothari and Watts (1996) The five discretionary accrual model were Healy (1985) , DeAngelo (1986) , Jones (1991) , Jones as modified in Dechow Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Dechow and Sloan (1991) .
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model is based on prior literature evaluating the accrual models (Dechow et al. 1995; Guay et al. 1996) . In selecting the appropriate model into this research design, it has been highlighted that the sample of this study is non-listed companies.
Accrual Model
In the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
DCFO t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if CFO is negative, and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
The results are further evaluated controlling for firm size and industry in section 4. The sample consists of small and medium-sized private firms with turnover on average 1.637 thousand euros (median 620 thousand). The industry classification is based on seven main industries: agriculture and forestry, industry, construction, wholesale and retail sale, transportation and telecommunications, professional services, health care and social services. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. The average loan margin is 1,5 % and average return on equity is 18,2 %. Loan service coverage median is 2,3 that represents a good loan repayment ability. Variable definitions: TA is Total Assets in thousand euros; LT is Long-term Loans in thousand euros; LM-% Loan Margin in percentage; ROE-% is return on equity -%; LSC is Loan Service Coverage as a ratio of income before extra-ordinary items to loan repayments. ACC, accruals scaled by beginning of total assets, where accruals are change in inventory + change in debtors + change in other current assets -change in creditors -change in other current liabilities -depreciation; CFO, earnings before extra-ordinary items less accruals, scaled by beginning of total assets.
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Main Results
This section examines whether reporting conservatism is exists in private firms, and the impact of reporting quality characteristics, as timely loss recognition, on the loan pricing.
Test of the First Hypothesis
First, I examine the asymmetric timeliness using Ball & Shivakumar (2005) accrual-based model. In table 3 the regression shows that on average 52 % of cash flow is offset by accruals in years it is positive ( 2 ). As predicted, 3 is positive (0,62) and significant, consistently with asymmetrically more unrealized loss recognition via accruals than gain recognition. This notion is consistent with my first hypothesis. 
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Test of the Second Hypothesis
The 
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The results are presented in table 4. The coefficients 2 a n d 3 are qualitatively similar than in the first regression (table 3) . Positive premium firm pays higher loan margin compared to equivalent internal rating group mean. For positive premium firms, 7 is -0,31 and statistically significant. This means that positive premium firms appear to accrue less unrealized losses in cash-loss years compared to negative premium firms that tend to recognize their losses more timely.
The interpretation is that the level of conservatism is higher in firms that have lower loan margin, consistent with predictions of contracting theory (Watts 2003 a,b) . In this sense, the firms that are committed to conservative reporting are Variables: Dependent variable: ACCt, accruals in year t, standardized by beginning total assets. Accruals are defined as earnings before exceptional items and extra-ordinary items minus cash from operations. Independent variables: CFO, cash from operations in year t, defined as earnings before exceptional items and extra-ordinary items in period t + Depreciation -(Working capital), standardized by total assets at end of t-1. (Working capital), = Debtors + Other current assets -Creditors -Other current liabilities. DCFO t = 1 if CFOt < 0; = 0 otherwise. The regressions exclude extreme 1 % on each side for ACC t and CFO t. DPP, dummy for loan interest premium. = 1 if positive premium firm; else 0; SIZEt, total assets at end of year t, standardized to the interval (0,1). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Robustness Checks
The endogeneity problem has to be considered in measuring the level of conservatism and the loan variables. These variables may be affected by the same firm characteristics simultaneously. The borrower specific risk, its evaluation process
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and the initial risk rating affect the pricing of the loan. The pricing of the loan is also influenced by collateral value and other loan conditions. In this study the firm' s risk rating is treated as a control variable based on bank' s internal rating. Table 5 presents the classification of loan margins based on bank' s internal ratings. The highest internal rating 1 represents the lowest risk, and the loan margin mean is 1,08%. Loan margin increseases gradually when the internal rating weakens, and finally the group of firms with the highest risk categorization pay 1,69% loan margin on average. It seems that the pricing of firm-specific credit risk follows the bank' s internal rating classification. Loan collateralization is controlled using dummy variable on high and low asset tangibility. I formulated tangibility variable as a division of current assets and total assets. The estimation results show that asset tangibility is significant, but the main results remain unchanged (results are not reported). (29) cases. Taxation and accounting regulation has traditionally influenced the finnish financial reporting practice for a long time towards more conservative reporting.
However, these other explanations for reporting conservatism does not demarcate the contracting explanation for reporting conservatism and loan margin considerations, as such, are not associated with shareholder litigation, taxation or accounting regulation.
As earlier mentioned, the financial reporting quality consists of seven attributes of earnings: quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, timeliness, relevance and conservatism (Francis et al. 2004 ). I address notions on earnings quality, timeliness and conservatism, because these attributes are close to each other conceptually. Earnings quality captures the mapping of current accruals into lastperiod, current period and next period cash flows. This is usually measured using Dechow-Dichev (2002) model. Timeliness and conservatism of earnings as concepts have similarities, but they differ from each other on their ability to reflect economic losses and gains. Conservatism allows for asymmetric timeliness of negative and positive earnings focusing on the negative side. Francis et al (2004) find that the most favorable values of each earnings attribute individually decreases the cost of capital, but they do not perform any empirical testing on cost of loan. I find that higher conservatism links with lower loan margin and the empirical testing of other earnings attributes is left for further research.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Public and private firms have differential demand for financial reporting. Several prior studies have examined the financial reporting quality in public firms, but academic literature lacks of evidence on financial reporting quality in private firms. However, private firms constitute the major part of business operations in many societies. Prior studies have identified several attributes of financial reporting quality. Quality in financial reporting should be defined in firm context that a priori would be relevant on firms reporting incentives.
There is a demand for conservative reporting in loan contracts. Loanholders possibilities to obtain private information on firm' s reporting quality is restricted, and therefore banks would favour conservative reporting instead of fair value or fraudulent reporting. Loanholders have a relatively greater demand for bad news, and if firms fail to provide such information, loanholders will price protect and impose a higher cost of capital on the firm.
First, I examined whether reporting conservatism exists in private firms using asymmetric timeliness measure that is widely accepted method in prior financial accounting research. Second, I examined the pricing of reporting conservatism in private firm loan contracts. I found that reporting conservatism exists in private firms. Further, I found that the level of conservatism is higher in firms that have lower loan margin, consistent with predictions of contracting theory. In this sense, the firms that are committed to conservative reporting are compensated in loan margin.
Financial system in Finland is referred as bank-based system and bank is one of the firm' s major stakeholders. Demand for conservative reporting in private firms could be also found from other sources than loan contracts, for example taxation. Overall, the initial reason for conservative reporting could be also found from institutional factors. This area is left for further research.
